Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Ali Reza Darabi; Lotfollah Nabavi
Volume 5, Issue 2 , September 2014, , Pages 31-53
Abstract
According to a rule in Avicenna's logic, there exists cohesion between any two necessary hypothetic propositions with identical quantity, different quality, identical antecedent, and denial of the consequent. The rule is introduced and has been argued for, by Avecinna. After him, this rule is criticized ...
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According to a rule in Avicenna's logic, there exists cohesion between any two necessary hypothetic propositions with identical quantity, different quality, identical antecedent, and denial of the consequent. The rule is introduced and has been argued for, by Avecinna. After him, this rule is criticized by Avicennian logicians. Khunaji questioned Avecinna’s pre-assumptions of this proof by examples of natural language. After Khunaji, some logicians like Nasir al-Din Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Razi, and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi tried to answer Khunaji’s critiques by presenting some better formalizations of Avecinna’s arguments or defending his pre-assumptions. In this paper, after introducing the arguments of both sides together with their detailed formalizations, it is concluded that the answers to Khunaji’s critiques are not enough to prove the aforementioned rule, and accepting this rule still requires new arguments.
Seied Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Homan Mohammad Ghorbanian; Lotfollah Nabavi; Arsalan Golfam
Volume 4, Issue 1 , March 2013, , Pages 44-64
Abstract
Many philosophers claim that semantic content of language is normative, which means that meaning of a term prescribes the pattern of use or determines which pattern of use can be described as ‘correct’. The most important arguments for normativity, made by Kripke, Boghossian and others, are ...
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Many philosophers claim that semantic content of language is normative, which means that meaning of a term prescribes the pattern of use or determines which pattern of use can be described as ‘correct’. The most important arguments for normativity, made by Kripke, Boghossian and others, are based on the concepts of ‘regularities’, ‘correct uses’ and ‘possibility of semantic mistakes’. But some philosophers have scrutinized the slogan ‘meaning is normative’ and have found some flaws in pro arguments. There are good reasons to consider the normativity of meaning as a side effect of ‘being public ’; that is, meaning, as itself, is neutral to correct or incorrect uses, but the moral or social laws of society impose several norms on language.
